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Resettling Peoples, Redressing
Histories: Challenging Answers
to the Land Question
in Namibia and the Netherlands
Liora Barba

I. Introduction

N

early a decade after national liberation in South Africa and
Namibia, demonstrators outside of the 2002 United Nations Conference on Development filled the streets of Johannesburg with the
resounding melodies of apartheid protest songs. Meanwhile, inside
the conference gates, former President Thabo Mbeki called for an “end
to global apartheid.”
That same year, in the small city of Hilversum, Dutch politician Pim
Fortuyn was shot dead. Known for his nationalist, right-wing politics,
Fortuyn emerged as a prominent political figure, acquiring a cult following by appealing to anti-immigrant sentiment. His death inspired a
resurgence of nationalism and xenophobia in a country that once stood
for integration and tolerance.
These seemingly disconnected incidents demonstrate how, at both
the local and the global level, people remain divided. As activists
around the world organize under the rallying cry to fight global apartheid, disparities in rights to space and access to resources and social
services persist at the local level. Macalester College’s study abroad
program, Globalization in Comparative Perspective, granted me the
invaluable opportunity to explore firsthand this dynamic interplay of
the local and the global. Over the course of my semesters of study in
Namibia and the Netherlands, I explored the spatial dimensions of this
global phenomenon, looking at the meaning of segregation and the
politics of place in the global age.
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To narrow this broad study, I focus on two specific populations and
national contexts: the San in Namibia and the Moluccan community in
the Netherlands. Grounded in these case studies, I examine the persistence of socio-spatial marginalization and inequity before moving on
to analyze the impact of global forces on these national and localized
conflicts. In Namibia, I examine how the land reform process serves as
a means of transcending the infrastructure of apartheid. In the Netherlands, I look at the evolution of the Moluccan community following
postcolonial resettlement. Exploring the politicization and social constructions of ethnic identities in each context, I critique the ideology
and design of resettlement and reform programs. I also assess failures
in the implementation process, highlighting how these initiatives can
ultimately reinforce the marginal social status of the very people that
they claim to serve.
This exploration is based on the premise that social and political
dynamics are reflected through spatial organization. I hope to illuminate the underlying power structures that perpetuate spatial inequality at both the national and international level.
Further, I examine the role of these conflicts in the process of postconflict reconciliation in the context of international justice. In addition,
I explore how transnational advocacy initiatives that claim to empower
can inadvertently perpetuate narratives that reinforce the socio-spatial
marginalization of those on whose behalf they claim to advocate.
To carry out this study, I utilize a combination of academic texts
and critical conversations in the places that were the subject, as well as
the location, of my study. I reviewed literature in the social sciences,
various media sources, non-profit groups, government organizations,
and international governing bodies involved in issues of migration,
resettlement, and integration. To lend perspective to my reading of
these texts, I interviewed individuals involved in social services and
public advocacy.
II. Transforming the Political Landscape:
Resettlement Policies in Namibia and the Netherlands
Though globalization demands a re-evaluation of the nation-state, it
does not render it irrelevant. Rather, it is a process that calls into question governmental obligations as it transforms the nature of national
affiliations. Recognizing this integral, albeit changing, role of the state
in the global era, I have chosen to focus on policy. While land reform
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has become the focus of heated debate in post-apartheid Namibia,
the challenges of integrating and understanding a growing immigrant
population has taken center stage in the Dutch political arena. From
rural Namibian farmlands to the suburbs of small cities in the Netherlands, globalization has not rendered the physical landscape irrelevant,
but, rather, is redefining the terms of the politics of space. Though society in the global age may be increasingly detached from territory—no
longer locked into specific localities—the symbolic value of territory
and the particularities of locality retain their significance.
My project also presupposes that ongoing internal conflicts now
play out on global stages, which reframe disputes over land. In addition to critiquing the rhetoric of policy and program design, I evaluate
project implementation in each case in order to highlight how government failure to adequately supply social services can effectually
undermine post-conflict reconciliation. Internal conflicts now play out
through competing claims to space; divisions are reinforced by lingering segregation and patterns of land ownership and residence. “The
identity of a place emerges by the intersection of its specific involvement in a system of hierarchically organized spaces with its cultural
construction as a community or locality.”1 Thus, these localized conflicts bear both national and international significance, reflective of
wider national and international contexts.
To illustrate the ongoing centrality of the state and its physical territory, I have chosen to examine resettlement policies. In Namibia and
the Netherlands these policies target populations based upon their
perceived marginalization.
III. Resettling Peoples, Reinforcing Inequality:
The San in Northeastern Namibia
Before delving into these issues, a word on terminology is necessary.
When I refer to the San, I do not use the label uncritically. I understand
the emergence of the San as a distinct ethnic group to be product of
Namibia’s colonial history as well as an ongoing political process. I
employ the term, however, because of its prominence in policy and
advocacy. Those now classified as San in social policy consist largely of
the peoples formerly referred to as Bushmen during colonial conquest
in Southern Africa. San is a linguistic classification adopted in order to
classify various groups in the region concentrated mainly in Botswana,
South Africa, and Namibia. Ethnic identities are not only politicized,
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but serve a distinct role in public policy. I aim to shed light on external narratives of San identity as well as the national and international
implications of labeling, rather than trying to reveal the self-conception
of these peoples or the diverse identities lumped together under the
label “San.” Thus, it is the political identity attached to ethnic groupings that I explore, not the meanings of these groupings themselves.
Following independence from colonial rule in 1990, Namibia’s government faced the tremendous challenge of reconstructing social welfare programs. Apartheid rule in the colonial era was designed to lock
a black majority into poverty. Decades of apartheid rule resulted in
a lingering spatial isolation and socioeconomic stratification rivaling
that in South Africa and Brazil. Though social welfare programs have
the potential to help Namibians break out of these structures of isolation and inequity, shortcomings in the provision of key services on
the part of the state not only fail to transform the system, but can also
serve to trap people in poverty and reinforce colonial era narratives.
Insufficient healthcare in the face of a growing HIV/AIDS pandemic,
inadequate education, and the lack of available housing are among
the failures in social services that contribute to widespread frustration
in a nation already largely disillusioned with the post-independence
government.
Although land reform in Namibia attempts to deconstruct the social
infrastructure of apartheid rule, the process has inadvertently undermined national reconciliation and failed to reverse the growing socioeconomic inequality. More than the simple reallocation of land from
a white minority to a black majority, the reform process attempts to
redefine land rights and tenure systems in order to redress inequity
rooted in past injustice. While commercial land under freehold tenure
plays a major role in the reform process, it is the redistribution of land
through communal land reform and resettlement policy that directly
impacts the majority of Namibians.
The 1997 National Resettlement Program (NRP) claims to empower
landless Namibians, the poorest of the nation’s poor. Within this broad
category of “formerly disadvantaged Namibians,” the NRP identifies
the San as one of a few primary program beneficiaries. However, the
NRP represents only the latest chapter in a long history of the dislocation and relocation of the people now classified as the San. What
is more, in order to resettle the San, policymakers must first locate
them. In doing so, the state and non-governmental organizations alike
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reinforce social narratives depicting the peripheral social status of the
group as manifested by socio-spatial isolation and insecure tenure.
The NRP allocates tenure rights through Communal Land Boards
and Traditional Authority structures. Though the government grants
tenure rights, it keeps communal land in the hands of the state. Allocating leases of up to ninety-nine years for settlers, the Namibian government ultimately “vests trust in the State for the benefit of ‘traditional’
communities.”2, 3 Hence, ethnic groups are accepted as political entities, and these identities and affiliations play an integral role in the
construction of the state.
Despite the politicization of ethnic groups, ethnic divisions and discrimination also dominate policy making and the political process.
Group interests in the land reform process are furthered by representatives on regional land boards, and many San communities and
advocacy groups have expressed concern regarding the lack of representation of San communities in regional land negotiations. The
Ju/‘hoansi and !Xoo, based in Omaheke, were denied recognition by
the government in 2001.4 The decision demonstrates the underlying
lack of political power allocated to San groups. They are rendered passive recipients of government programs—targeted beneficiaries rather
than participants in the reform process.
Insecure tenure is also symptomatic of this underlying lack of political power. Although it is clear that contemporary tenure insecurity is
rooted in past subjugation, according to the NRP, land reform is not
to function as a form of reparations. As such, land rights will not be
awarded based upon ancestral claims.
At the same time, the reform process aims to improve the socioeconomic status of “formerly disadvantaged Namibians.” Thus, while the
drafters of the reform process have attempted to avert the lengthy and
ultimately impossible task of restoring pre-colonial land holdings, the
political agenda underwriting the effort cannot be ignored. Transforming the physical landscape, land reform is central to efforts to reclaim
the political landscape following colonialism.
In another attempt to avoid controversy in the reform process, state
policy classifies Namibian land by usage for the purposes of redistribution rather than according to holdings. The Ministry for Land Reform
and Resettlement (MLRR) classifies land for reform purposes in terms
of communal versus commercial areas. Such a division is a superficial
one. The first consists of more agriculturally productive and commercially oriented territories frequently owned by white Namibian farm-
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ers, and the second consists of land predominately populated by Black
Namibians. Although liberated from formal apartheid rule, the divisions stemming from apartheid policy remain firmly in place. In other
words, the divisions between a minority elite land-owning class and
the majority of the nation’s poor communal farmers persist.
While uneven patterns of land use in post-independence Namibia
are the product of colonial era land seizures, the infrastructure of colonial rule, the reform process avoids racial classifications. The choice to
employ an alternative framework for understanding social divisions
represents a conscious effort to move away from racial classifications,
to promote a national consciousness that no longer functions along
black and white lines. Though this approach attempts to avoid racial
classifications, the reform process continues to employ ethnic terms,
identifying the San as a distinct group and political entity for resettlement purposes.
Turning to the controversial issue of expropriation, Namibia’s
approach to commercial reform is guided by a willing buyer/willing
seller model. It is notably passive when it comes to expropriating commercial property. This type of policy stands as a dramatic divergence
from the more radical socialist rhetoric underlining liberation era politics. Former president and leader in the liberation movement, Sam
Nujoma, who oversaw the establishment of a number of key reform
policies, including this one, noted that:
It has to be said that the Constitutional Principles document was formulated by the Americans and the British to favour the interests of individual white settlers…It must be clearly stated that the inclusion of a clause,
which serves to perpetuate the status quo of inequity in land distribution
in Namibia, was never in line with SWAPO’s position in addressing the
land question in Namibia. The inclusion of this clause has resulted in the
problem of lands, which we have after the turn of the millennium.5

In light of the slow pace of commercial land acquisition for reform
and resettlement, little has changed. Currently, 3,800 white commercial
farmers maintain ownership of just under half of Namibia’s territory,
while approximately one million black Namibians occupy communal
areas. Without adequate commercial land on which to resettle landless
Namibians, the majority of resettlement programs have taken place in
communal areas. Relocating landless peasants into communal areas
in the less agriculturally productive northern zone has not served as
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an effective means of redistributing wealth or alleviating poverty. The
expropriation of commercial farmlands is necessary in order to obtain
adequate space for the resettlement of landless Namibians. Without
sufficient land for resettlement, the NRP simply relocates poor farmers
into new settlements where they continue to struggle to subsist. It does
not tackle the greater task of transforming the structures underwriting
the current inequitable distribution of land.
Further, by maintaining state ownership of communal lands, the
process fails to award permanent title to beneficiaries. Instead, these
programs award usufruct rights to use of the land and its resources,
reinforcing a colonial era view of communal lands as peripheral areas
of low agricultural productivity.
This points to the limits of land reform under Namibia’s nationalist, liberation party government: “Traditional mainstream nationalism
has turned yesterday’s natives into postcolonial settlers and postcolonial natives…Even with the colonial power gone, we keep defining
every citizen as either a native or a settler!”6 The persistence of the
dichotomy between settler and native in postcolonial resettlement in
Namibia demonstrates that Namibians have yet to be liberated from
colonial era structures for organizing power.
Compounding the situation, commercial farm expropriations displace farm workers, many of whom identify as San. In this way, land
reform that promotes expropriation also undermines its stated goals
of serving the poor. The issue of dispossession as connected to expropriation demonstrates how communal resettlement and commercial
reform are deeply intertwined and interdependent. Progress in one
area is dependent upon progress in the other. Resettlement is thus an
essential part of a larger process of reformulating the relationship of
the people to the land. This is a process that would involve granting
permanent tenure rights as well as transforming segregated residential
patterns in urban as well as rural locations.
While the NRP involves the reallocation of tenure, it does little to
promote alternative forms of tenure that could benefit the San. What
is more, by failing to promote alternative tenure systems, resettlement
programs perpetuate colonial era views regarding efficient versus inefficient land use. Within this framework, San land use is frequently
deemed unproductive and inefficient. “It is the government’s goal to
get the other Bushmen who still lead a nomadic life to settle them in
locations especially built for them…It is in any case the goal of the
Catholic Mission to get Bushman out of nomadism,” reads one colonial
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era document, “and to have them living in allocated areas as borders,”
tenants on land owned by wealthy white Namibians.7
Though less overt in claiming that citizens’ use of the land must
be in line with a certain national ideology or value system, the contemporary land reform process leaves little room for divergence from
mainstream, commercially focused land practices. Nomadic land uses
patterns widely practiced among San peoples are not legitimated by
commercial definitions of tenure. Moreover, these hunter-gatherer
based livelihoods are incompatible with animal grazing practiced by
the majority of communal farmers in Namibia. Consequently, current
resettlement policy does little to bring about the type of fundamental
reform that could change the socioeconomic status of resettled peoples.
Furthermore, while resettlement programs attempt to combat marginalization, these initiatives have perpetuated widespread perceptions of the San as a lazy and dependent subgroup. These notions
have combined with official policy and program rhetoric to construct
stereotypes of dependency. These attitudes have fueled discrimination,
inciting internal violence and conflict among Namibians, hindering
post-conflict reconciliation following apartheid and the struggle for
liberation.
In addition, rights to the land in communal areas are allocated under
the authority of traditional leaders, utilizing a system for consultation
with the government tied to the divvying up of Namibian land into the
ethnically divided homelands of the colonial era. In the latest phase of
international indigenous rights legislation, environmental protections
are increasingly incorporating indigenous people into their mandates,
asserting their voice in provisions related to the land and its resources.
Among these, the Convention on Biological Diversity, created in 1992,
states that, “practices of indigenous and local communities [are]
embodying traditional lifestyles relevant for the conservation and sustainable use of biological resources.” Thus, community-based natural
resource management programs must be placed within the context of
broader trends in programs that seek to re-envision the relationship of
communities to the land and its resources.
In his inaugural address, Namibian President Pohamba stated that,
“traditional leaders are custodians of our cultural heritage; they are
also promoters of our traditional values.”8 Yet, “traditional” is a broad
and ambiguous label, which encompasses a wide variety of leadership
structures and types of land usage. Tradition is not static, nor are the
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wide array of livelihoods termed “traditional.” While deeming a practice as such grants it a certain cultural value, it also relegates it to the
margins.
What is more, the elections of traditional authorities are not without controversy, and issues of representation have plagued the reform
process. The current tribal authority system draws from the leadership
structures put into place during the colonial conquest. In this light,
the continued use of many representatives for consultation in the land
reform process today legitimizes notions of indigenous group identity
through the homeland system.
As a window into the limitations of resettlement programs, I focus
on two resettlement locations in the northeastern region of Omaheke,
Skoonheid, and Drimiopsis. Approximately 8,000 people classified by
the state as members of the San, including Ju/‘hoansi, Naro and !Xoo
groups, live in the Omaheke, making the region home to one of the
nation’s largest San populations.
In Skoonheid, resettlement began in 1993 on three farms, consisting
of Herero, Damara, and Owambo residents in addition to a San majority. Residents are mainly comprised of former commercial farm workers new to communal agriculture, and are supported by Food for Work
programs implemented by the government. This program is only the
most recent in a long history of government subsidies targeting the San
that exchange labor for food. It is as if the San exist outside of the wage
labor system, and, as such, have become a type of “underclass.”9 The
prominence of this type of welfare program in resettlement locations
reinforces economic dependency and, consequently, the status of the
San as a dependent sub-class.
Further, conditions of poverty have reinforced divisions among ethnic groups, straining communities and contributing to inter-ethnic conflict. Interviews with residents conducted through a recent survey by
Namibia’s only public assistance law firm, the Legal Assistance Center
(LAC), reveal internal conflicts running along ethnic lines. One Damara
woman stated that, “The future…depends on whether the other tribe
[the San] are able to change their attitude.”10 Another Damara resident
explained that, “The relationship with the San community is not good.
We are always told by the San people that this is their farm.”11 The
statement speaks to how longstanding, competing claims to land contribute to ongoing conflict in communities composed of residents of
several ethnic affiliations. Thus, while it may not be possible to restore
land based on ancestry, the injustice of dislocation and expropriation
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manifested by tenure insecurity continues to shape the attitudes of
beneficiaries regarding one another just as they undermine the cooperation necessary for the success of resettlement programs.
The words of one San resident also reveal this challenge: “If we get
some space then it is not long before the blacks take it and bring in
their cattle. When they come, they don’t see us and we must live under
them…when we tell them to leave they say you are just a Bushman—
you cannot have land.”12
The statement reveals how attitudes regarding ethnicity can be
employed in order to rationalize the denial of land rights to those classified as San. First of all, it is widely held that the San have been marginalized in terms of their rights to the land because they have never
made claim to permanent land rights. This is a function of the exclusion of the San from systems of land ownership as well as the nature
of patterns of land use employed by many San. Rather than settling on
a piece of land to raise livestock or grow crops, the San have tended to
hunt and gather, dependent upon watering holes and wild animals for
their subsistence. Thus, it has been easy for other groups to come into
an area occupied by the San in order to utilize the land for their own
purposes.
The language used regarding race in this instance is also extremely
telling of lingering divides, and the transfer of the black and white
divisions of apartheid into the postcolonial era. The speaker refers to
“blacks” when discussing other ethnic groups, supporting a view of
the San as a race apart from the majority black population, reinforcing
the identification of the San as an indigenous minority and unique subpopulation.
Furthermore, employing the word “Bushman” as a label for the San
ties contemporary identities into a colonial history. This is a history,
that has worked to construct a homogenous identity based in part on
the perception of deep-seated marginalization and subjugation of an
ethnic group from a diverse group of people with a variety of tribal
affiliations. “The Bushman think this place belongs to them,” another
resident noted.13
Findings in nearby Drimiopsis also speak to the prevalence of conflicts among resettled peoples as well as expose flaws in program
design. This smaller area, consisting of 120 family units, was originally
intended to serve only as a temporary camp. Although many residents
have moved on to Skoonheid, Drimiopsis remains overcrowded and
occupied by temporary residents that have yet to officially register
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with the government. As is the case in Skoonheid, the majority of residents are landless former large commercial farm laborers categorized
as of San ancestry.
What limited social services are available are inaccessible to the
majority of residents. Many are unable to afford school fees. Many
cannot access water, because the diesel engines for pumps have been
stolen. This theft is symptomatic of the frequency of crime, evidence of
how the lack of governmental protections and police services undermines the successful implementation of social policy.
In another area of Omaheke, Animus, police have been accused of
harassing San residents. According to a lawyer representing the victims of police harassment, officers confiscated vehicles and assaulted
San children. These acts are one of a number of alleged rights violations and abuses of the San at the hands of the police. They are not
isolated occurrences. In 1999, three traditional leaders made official
complaints of “emotional harassment” by the Omaheke police and
claimed that officers had broken into their homes and taken property.
In another instance, police in Omaheke were accused of taking and
consuming meat belonging to the San.14
Ongoing tensions in Skoonheid also demonstrate the broader context of violence and conflict in the region. Domestic violence is reportedly widespread, as are thefts. Another resident claimed that the San
are “dirty” and stated that, “it is all the Bushman who are stealing our
belongings.”15
The challenges involved in dealing with crime demonstrate how an
underlying lack of basic social services can fuel inter-ethnic tensions.
Without a police force, the people of Skoonheid are forced to settle disputes themselves, which complicates relationships and creates conflict
among community members.
Returning to the case of Dripmiosis, in addition to a monthly food
package, many settlers are involved in MLRR’s Food for Work programs. Yet these programs fail to create economic independence. For
instance, residents involved in the Food for Work scheme are required
to work in a communal garden and must sell the surplus. Rather than
reaping the rewards of their labor, they must put any profits earned
into a bank account outside of the settlement.
One San resident, Dina, has spent her life as a domestic worker for
whites in the region and has not found economic independence in
Dripmiosis. Although she has ambitions to start her own business to
generate some kind of income, resettlement has left her without the
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tools to develop this ambition. Without the tools for economic independence, beneficiaries are forced to either seek work on commercial
farms, labor for wealthier communal farmers in the North, or continue
to live in poverty on overcrowded communal lands.
According to Odendaal and Harring, the pervasive view of resettlement beneficiaries, especially the San, as “loafers” has made its way
into discussions at the level of the national government. Counter to
this perception, researchers reported that, overall:
Resettlement projects are full of people with the desire to make a living,
but frustrated by a lack of support and a lack of opportunity. Many are
unemployed or underemployed so, on any given day, many people will
be sitting around standing and not working.16

In both locations, national cohesion and reconciliation are undermined by the failure of the state to provide adequate support services
or meet basic needs in resettled communities. Resettled San are locked
into dependency, reinforcing their peripheral status and promoting
discriminatory views of the San as a sub-population. Frequently dislocated and unable to subsist on agricultural activity or to acquire
employment in impoverished resettlement locations, many are forced
to continue to seek work at commercial farms. As such, resettlement
locations represent only a new stop in continuing cycles of dislocation
tied to the spatial insecurity of landless Namibians.
NRP program administrators have even admitted to the failures
of project implementation thus far. According to Namibia’s national
newspaper, the Headman of Skoonheid, Frederick Langman, “said
that he and his people are still not ‘feeling’ the fruits of freedom.”17
Furthermore, in 2001 members of Omaheke’s resettled communities
put forward an official complaint to the MLRR demanding that the
ministry send a delegation to the area “to investigate pressing problems in their communities.”18 These problems include various incidents involving harassment by both community members and police
forces in addition to theft. Specifically, in 2004, a dozen members of the
San community in the Omaheke region declared their intention to sue
Herero communal farmers, claiming that these farmers strung up from
a tree two individuals later identified as San residents. The incident
demonstrates how conflicts over the land continue to be directly linked
to violence. Although conflict may be declared officially over, these
confrontations demonstrate that civil conflict persists. Confrontations
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over rights to the land and land use serve as a platform through which
internal tensions now play out, prolonging strife decades after the long
war for liberation.
IV. The Moluccan Community: Perpetual Allochtoon?
Although the rise in popularity of nationalist politician Pim Fortuyn
and the murder of filmmaker Theo van Gough made the weaknesses
of multiculturalism in the Netherlands headline news, these incidents
represent only the latest episode in a long history of the challenges of
multicultural integration in the Netherlands. Ethnic Dutch and immigrant communities alike have long struggled to foster tolerance and
social justice. The difficulty of such a task has been made particularly
relevant in light of recent anti-Muslim hate crimes and widespread
public fears of the Islamic community.
This fear of the “Other” and the hesitance of the majority to incorporate outside communities into Dutch society are not specifically
attached to Dutch Muslims. Decades before the most recent resurgence
in fears of terrorism and violence associated with Muslim immigrants,
the Dutch were confronted with the threat of violence within their
nation’s borders.
Examining the history of the Moluccan community in the Netherlands offers a window into the conflicts and contradictions embedded in Dutch multiculturalism today. Dutch Moluccans have been
frequently portrayed as an ideal immigrant group through the lens of
an assimilationist model of integration, receiving labels like innocuous
and well adjusted. Yet, just a few decades ago, Moluccans in the Netherlands were associated with a series of terrorist attacks. These acts
forced the people of the Netherlands to reconsider the nature of Dutch,
Moluccan, and Dutch-Moluccan identities alike.
The formation of this hybrid identity began before the first members
of the South Indonesian island population set foot in the Netherlands
in 1951. Throughout the 20th century, Moluccans took on a unique role
in the colonial ruling system in the Dutch East Indies. Following the
economic decline of the regional spice trade, which had earned the
islands the nickname Spice Islands, many Moluccans were recruited to
serve as soldiers for the Dutch colonial army, the KNIL.
Nicknamed “Black Dutchmen,”19 Moluccan soldiers earned a reputation for their loyalty to the Dutch crown. As in Namibia, national
divisions were drawn along ethnic lines. Divide-and-rule tactics rein-
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forced ethnic differences. Compounding this fragmentation, many
soldiers already identified themselves as standing on the fringes of
Indonesian and Javanese society because they adhered to a minority
Christian faith. Tapping into pre-existing factions for the benefit of
consolidating colonial rule, Dutch colonial authorities classified the
people of the Ambon islands, now referred to as the South Moluccas,
as an ethnic minority. In an attempt to quell resistance to Dutch rule,
colonial forces splintered opposition groups fighting for an independent and unified Indonesia. To assist in this task, members of the KNIL
were deployed throughout the East Indies in order to stifle internal
upheaval and consolidate Dutch rule in the face of growing Indonesian
resistance.
Testament to mounting separatism in the region, many Moluccans
had their own political aspirations apart from national independence.
In the wake of colonial rule, the former soldiers of the KNIL feared
persecution for their service and allegiance to the crown. This political
divide, the peripheral geography of the island territory, and the prevalence of a minority Christian faith in a predominantly Muslim culture
all combined to foster an overarching sense of separateness within the
Moluccan community in the region. This sense inspired one group of
Moluccans to stake a claim to an independent republic in 1950. Just
one year following the establishment of an independent Indonesia,
the act marks the beginning of a long struggle for political autonomy,
an ambition that has taken on symbolic meaning for Moluccans living
abroad, as disputes over territory now persist into the beginning of the
21st century.
Even at this early stage, nationalist organizing took place in a distinctly international arena. The U.N. worked alongside the Dutch and
Javanese as the Moluccan community declared the Republic Malaku
Selatan (RMS) through Article 2 of the 3rd Agreement in the draft
of the new republic of Indonesia, which offered national factions the
opportunity to opt out of the emerging and newly unified nation.
Moluccans in the Netherlands advocating the political autonomy of
the RMS throughout the middle of the last century also directed claims
toward the U.N., appealing to the supranational body through various
political factions fighting for the RMS in Indonesia and abroad.
Moreover, this struggle for an autonomous republic had taken on
symbolic value for the community resettled in the Netherlands. Following World War II, approximately 12,000 of the 25,000 demobilized
Moluccan KNIL soldiers were repatriated to the Netherlands and
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placed in camps throughout the country. This program was originally
conceived of as a temporary arrangement intended to repay ex-soldiers
for their loyalty to the crown by allowing them (and their families) a
safe exile in the Netherlands. Not intended to serve as a permanent
solution, resettlement programs failed to consider the long term. These
former military servants and their families found themselves in isolated settlements that included former concentration camps, such as
Schattenberg and Bught. The act that was once intended to do justice
for the subjects that put in the hard labor to establish the empire was
plainly inadequate in recognizing the former soldiers for their service.
Such treatment through resettlement revealed the contradictions
inherent in the Moluccans‘ social status in the Netherlands. Although
technically citizens of the Dutch colonial empire, spatial marginalization reinforced social marginalization, a condition designed by Dutch
policy. After Moluccans moved out of the camps, they were relocated
to isolated communities, to gated neighborhoods on the outskirts of
small cities. Locked into the periphery, Moluccans found themselves
living alongside rather than among the Dutch.
This is but one example of how the Dutch “Pillarization” model
of integration has fostered “remarkable subcultural segmentation…of
society in general.”20 Social distance based on perceived cultural difference was reflected by spatial segregation and uneven control over the
landscape. Here, in much the same way as in Namibia, spatial insecurity, segregation, and lack of land rights undermine national cohesion.
“The dilemma here is that while the population on the ground is multiethnic, the authority, the law, and the definition of rights are mono- or
uni-ethnic. The consequence is to divide the population ethnically…
[postcolonial] clashes about rights are less and less racial, more and
more ethnic.”21
As the years passed, supposedly temporary resettlement conditions
in the Netherlands revealed themselves as permanent living situations.
Former soldiers and their families struggled to remain united across
various cities through the struggle for self-determination. “Proud soldiers felt emasculated, quickly grabbing onto the RMS ideal to salvage
meaning in their lives.”22 Today, the “RMS ideal” is discussed more
frequently as an ideology than as a real political project. The symbolic
value awarded to the struggle speaks to the meaning of rights to land
and the power of space as a means of asserting political autonomy.
Locked into the outskirts, Dutch Moluccans found themselves in a
kind of double bind of marginalization and placelessness. In exile from
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the South Moluccas, where civil conflict persists, while simultaneously
locked into the margins of Dutch society, the community has been
united by a homeland that exists only in their collective imagination.
In view of this situation, the series of attacks organized by a small
group of second-generation Moluccan youths in the mid-1960s takes
on a renewed social and political significance for the larger Moluccan
community and among the Dutch as a whole. The youths that engaged
in this struggle through violent occupations were symbolically claiming territory as part of a struggle for rights to space beyond Dutch borders as they worked to assert the political autonomy of the RMS. They
gained notoriety by seizing the Indonesian Embassy and later hijacking a number of trains throughout the 1970s. Tensions came to a head
when the group occupied an elementary school in May of 1987. By this
point, the group had garnered international fame. Within the Netherlands, the hijackings and their aftermath forced the Dutch people to
confront a community that had been relegated to the margins.
This chapter in the struggle for political autonomy also took on a
distinctly international character. The youths were inspired by grassroots movements outside of their nation’s borders, drawing from the
Black Power movement in the United States. Today, Dutch Moluccans
continue to speak of the RMS ideal, and protests have been organized
in The Hague throughout the past decade in solidarity with ongoing
nationalism supporting the RMS and civil conflict in Indonesia.
Furthermore, the consequent stigmatization of Dutch Moluccans
as being associated with terrorist activity has worked to transform the
social identity of the community. Many have returned to governmentsanctioned neighborhoods where a sizeable portion of the population continues to reside, a testament to the lasting impact of policies
designed to divide.
Additionally, persistent spatial and social peripheralization demonstrates the limits of the pillarization model for integration. It is a model
that has functioned as the cornerstone of Dutch multiculturalism. Yet
it features an ideology that is met with increasing skepticism as social
divisions and tensions permeate the national dialogue on immigration.
“ ‘Multiculturalism’ is both a feeble acknowledgment of the fact that
cultures have lost their moorings in definite places and an attempt to
subsume this plurality of cultures within the framework of a national
identity.”23
As such, multiculturalism assumes cultural difference to be a threat
to national cohesion and stability. However, “a heterogeneous nation is
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not necessarily less capable of solidarity than a homogeneous one.”24
The idea that difference is inherently a threat to national cohesion is
present in both the Netherlands and Namibia. Thus, programs and
policies that target beneficiaries based on ethnic difference contradict
national ideologies regarding social cohesion.
Returning to the case of the Moluccan community in the Netherlands, the government has launched a number of policies that target
Moluccans in order to prevent the type of dissatisfaction that can contribute to the radicalization witnessed in the Sixties and Seventies.
From promises to pay reparations through an organization known
as the CAZ to educational associations like ISEM and the Moluccan
History Museum based in Utrecht, a number of social programs now
target the Dutch-Moluccan community in the Netherlands. The violent
incidents have forced the Dutch government to reconsider a group that
had once been conceived as model citizens, able to fit into the Dutch
multicultural system by remaining locked into the social and spatial
periphery.
Though generations of Dutch of Moluccan ancestry have lived their
lives in the Netherlands, the term allochtoon is continually employed to
describe members of the community. The name refers to second-generation immigrants and implies residual outsider status and lingering
connotations of foreignness despite official citizenship. The persistence
of the term in popular language stands as a testament to the limits of
Dutch-Moluccan integration to this day.
V. Reinforcing Marginalization:
The Ethnic Minority in Policy and Advocacy
Resettlement is inherently a political act. “If one begins with the premise that spaces have always been hierarchically interconnected, instead
of naturally disconnected, then cultural and social change becomes
not a matter of cultural contact and articulation but one of rethinking difference through connection.”25 While apartheid era Southern
Africa organized society along racial lines, the contemporary political
discourse in Namibia and the Netherlands uses ethnicity to classify
and to categorize. Although race is largely associated with discrimination, recognized for its role as a tool of oppression throughout history,
ethnic difference is widely accepted as a legitimate means of identifying members of society. The perception is that while society no longer
subscribes to racist ideologies, ethnic divides persist and undermine
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national cohesion. While race may be widely rejected as an appropriate means of classifying, ethnicity persists as a legitimate quality for
dividing peoples in each case. Though resettlement programs, which
attempt to tackle spatial marginalization, the political construction of
the ethnic minority through public policy and advocacy have actually
perpetuated the perceived separateness of these groups. Policies in
both countries identify program targets by establishing their vulnerability. Identifying the San as a distinct group based upon a shared
history of victimization, their cause has now been taken up by transnational organizations as well as appropriated by groups that claim to
advocate for indigenous or immigrant rights at the global level.
This notion of the ethnic minority represents a uniquely local identity at the same time as it functions as a universal label.
As groups migrate, regroup in new locations, reconstruct their histories,
and reconfigure their ethnic ‘projects’ the ethno in ethnography takes
on a slippery, nonlocalized quality. Groups are no longer tightly territorialized, spatially bounded, historically unselfconscious, or culturally
homogeneous.26

The notion of a sub-group, a minority, which stands apart from the
majority, cuts across national lines. Ethnicity, however, has played a
unique social role in each context rooted in the colonial era and influenced by trends in contemporary global politics and national developments. Although the Dutch were former colonizers and Namibia was a
former colonial holding, the ideologies that have legitimized the colonial project in each society continue to shape contemporary thought.
In both nations, race and ethnicity have served distinct social functions
and played key roles in the organization of the social landscape.
Understanding the meaning of race and ethnicity in contemporary
politics necessitates an exploration of the meaning of the terminology
in the colonial era. While the Dutch took on the role of colonizer and
Namibia the colonized, the ideology that grounded the colonial project
in each continues to inform and impact the politics of identity in each
nation. In Namibia, an indigenous majority now stands apart from the
ethnic minority classified as indigenous as well, yet regarded as culturally distinct.
Thus, the ethnic minority in both Namibian and Dutch policy must
be understood in terms of the historical and political connotations surrounding the social construction of ethnicity in each setting. Narratives
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of the global political arena, like that offered by the “Clash of Civilizations,” suggest that the world’s people resort to ethnic affiliations. This
ideology suggests that ethnic identities are somehow natural. Yet, to
reiterate, “a heterogeneous nation is [not] necessarily less capable of
solidarity than a homogenous one.”27
Contemporary public policy can also legitimize ethnic divisions. In
Namibia, rights associated with ethnicity differ from those attached to
citizenship. Ethnic groups are dealt with as communities, represented
by official, often externally appointed, “traditional” authorities in government negotiations. Citizens, on the other hand, participate in democratic national processes as individuals.28
In the Netherlands, ethnicity can also qualify citizenship. Immigrants are defined first by ethnic ancestry, while Dutch citizenship—
national identity—is secondary. In both cases, ethnicity is inherited and
portrayed as a simplistic, instinctual allegiance to a group identity. The
social narrative implied by this type of policy is that race is somehow
externally imposed as opposed to internally defined by communities
in the same way as ethnicity. In contemporary politics, this is especially significant because it implies that ethnicity is somehow more
legitimate. It is “natural” and authentic, specific to the unique qualities
and characteristics of those that it classifies. Moreover, the persistence
of ethnic labeling reinforces divisions between cultures, despite their
plurality in the Dutch multicultural context.
What is more, the language employed in policy generally classifies actors in terms of settlers and beneficiaries. The term beneficiaries
implies a one-sided dynamic in social policy. It suggests that those
resettled are the passive recipients of government assistance, subsidized by the government in the reform process. The failure of the state
to adequately deliver social services in Namibia has reinforced patterns
of dependency and locked program beneficiaries into a subsistence
livelihood through the welfare state. Similarly, it was dissatisfaction
with resettlement conditions and the failure of the Dutch government
to make good on the promise of establishing an independent RMS that
inspired civil conflict in the Seventies. Both cases illuminate how inadequate social services lock citizens into dependency, contributing to
lingering social conflict through contestations over space.
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VI. The Global Dimensions of National Conflicts:
New Platforms for Social Change
Despite new transnational alliances and international development initiatives, the gap between the global rich and poor continues to widen.
The conceptualization of a global apartheid by lobbying groups and
activists around the world presupposes that a globalized economic
structure reinforces socioeconomic underdevelopment in the South.
Though this dividing line is broadly drawn between hemispheres, it
is similar to those dividing former colonizers from colonies, the West
from the rest, or the developed from the developing world. It is one
of countless other terms intended to categorize the world to reflect
global inequality. Proponents of the framework argue that globalization polarizes the distribution of wealth and perpetuates the marginalization of the nations of the Global South.
Yet this depiction of the global world order is extremely simplistic,
and denies the interconnections between the dualities. Though apartheid is Dutch for “separate,” the two spheres constructed through
apartheid rule do not function in a vacuum from one another. Rather,
apartheid works by dictating the terms of interaction. Isolation combines with limited interaction to perpetuate the status quo. Creating
distinct social and economic spheres, apartheid rule in Southern Africa
exploited spatial divides in order to create an infrastructure that reinforced systems of power. In the case of Namibia, this consolidated
power into the hands of a white elite. In the contemporary world political order, this implies that power is now in the hands of an elite in the
Global North.
Looking at segregation only at the macro level, however, fails to
acknowledge the diversity that exists in the local context. The myth
of a Global South denies the diversity that exists within nations and
regions, and among peoples. The globalization process is unique in
that it transforms the global along local lines and the local along global
lines. Thus, local divisions are not only symptomatic of inequity, but
also serve as its structural reinforcement at the micro level.
Still, the narrative of a global apartheid perpetuates perceptions
regarding the exclusion of Africa from the globalization process,
especially the economic dimensions of globalization. “The developed
countries of the North have lost all sense of the noble idea of human
solidarity,”29 Mbeki argued at a conference in 1999. On another occasion, the South African president claimed that, “the process of global-
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ization is an objective outcome of the development of the productive
forces that create wealth.”30 Moreover, this sense of peripheral status
as depicted through narratives regarding Africa’s marginalization, the
notion that Africa has failed to “harness the processes of globalization,”31 suggests that an entire continent has been flatly excluded in
the global era. It denies the interconnections and systems of exploitation that dictate the terms of global politics and economics. Hence,
to appropriately use the apartheid system as a paradigm for understanding structures and systems of power in the era of globalization,
one must recognize how segregation constructs socio-spatial divisions
that reinforce uneven power dynamics at multiple levels. Globalization does not flatten. It is therefore essential to recognize how space,
both in terms of its symbolic and economic value, creates a foundation for wealth as well as a means of perpetuating social inequity and
exclusion.
Beyond their specific social contexts, new processes of working
for international justice and transnational advocacy are connecting
local conflicts to global struggles, creating a new transnational public
sphere.32 In this light, confrontations over space can serve as a new
platform through which the world’s people may strive to work for
social change. Tackling the spatial manifestations of socio-political
inequality can serve as a venue for addressing underlying social conflict. This is a task made particularly relevant in light of rapid developments in international justice and law in the global era. It represents
harnessing the power of globalization’s processes to work for change
as part of the cultivation of a global ethic as envisioned by Peter Singer
in One World, and other contemporary ethicists and social theorists
of the global age. Indeed, globalization transforms the internal realm
in addition to the external, forcing us to re-evaluate how we observe a
global phenomenon in addition to that phenomenon itself.
It is within this larger, globalized framework for understanding the
meaning that is attached to rights to space that initiatives to reform tenure and redistribute the land can reconcile conflicts at the international
level. This demands the reconceptualization of rights to space as well
as the deconstruction of the identities through which land ownership
and occupational rights are organized. It is a task that is essential in
harnessing the processes of globalization to work for a social change.
The global era presents an unparalleled opportunity for the transformation of intra- and inter-national divisions alike, for the transforma-
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tion of the social and political landscape, as we confront inequity as it
is expressed through the physical. 
•
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